For the past decade or longer, modern electronics has quietly relied on an assumption that is rarely stated, but almost always present when designing a new system: connectivity will always be available. From satellite navigation to cloud computing, engineers have often designed systems around the idea that external infrastructure will be there when it is needed.
Increasingly, that assumption no longer holds.
Across industrial automation, networking, and defence systems, engineers are rediscovering the importance of resilience and autonomy. Systems must continue functioning even when external signals disappear, are blocked, or are deliberately disrupted. In many sectors, this shift is driving a renewed focus on local processing, sensor fusion, and alternative navigation technologies.
Nowhere is this more visible than in the field of navigation.
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS), such as GPS, have become so embedded in modern technology that they often feel like a natural resource rather than an engineered infrastructure. Many people do not think twice about using GNSS signals when travelling, just assuming that the systems will be available. Yet the signals themselves are extremely weak by the time they reach Earth, which makes them vulnerable to interference, jamming, or spoofing. When disrupted, online receivers lose their ability to determine position, velocity, and timing.
For engineers, this has created an entire discipline around GNSS-denied navigation. Instead of relying on satellites alone, modern systems combine inertial sensors, cameras, radar, terrain mapping, and other onboard measurements to maintain navigation even when satellite signals are unavailable.
This topic is explored in more detail in this issue’s defence spotlight on non-GNSS navigation systems (see here). Technologies such as inertial navigation, terrain-referenced navigation, and vision-based positioning are becoming essential for autonomous vehicles, drones, and guided systems operating in contested environments.
Recent developments in the Middle East provide a real-world example of why such technologies matter. Analysts have reported that Iranian missile and drone systems may now be using China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system rather than relying on the US’s GPS alone. In earlier conflicts, electronic warfare reportedly disrupted GPS-guided weapons, exposing how vulnerable satellite-dependent systems can be.
The technical response to the lack of navigation signals in the earlier conflicts seems to have completely caught the West off guard. By integrating compatibility with alternative satellite constellations such as BeiDou and combining them with onboard guidance systems such as inertial navigation and optical seekers, weapon systems can maintain accuracy even when one navigation source is denied.
For design engineers, the lesson is clear. Connectivity is no longer something that can be assumed. Whether in industrial automation, robotics, autonomous vehicles, or defence systems, designs increasingly need to anticipate the loss of external signals.
This shift is already visible in many areas covered in Dataweek. Industrial systems are moving intelligence closer to the edge so that factories can continue operating without constant cloud connectivity. Networking infrastructure is becoming more resilient and distributed. Manufacturing equipment is increasingly moving back to local sensing and closed-loop control with only reporting being done in the cloud.
The same principle applies to navigation and positioning.
In the coming years, the most successful electronic systems may not be those with the most connectivity, but those that can continue operating when that connectivity disappears.
| Tel: | +27 11 543 5800 |
| Email: | [email protected] |
| www: | www.technews.co.za |
| Articles: | More information and articles about Technews Publishing |
© Technews Publishing (Pty) Ltd | All Rights Reserved
printer friendly version